主題｜Topic：Heterogeneity and Unanimity: Optimal Committees with Information Acquisition
時間｜Time：11.18（周一）14: 00-15: 30
地點｜Venue：文澴樓教室｜Class Room 428，WENHUAN
主辦單位｜Organizer：澳门永利集团304官网手机
承辦單位｜Operator：數實融合研究中心；北京大學-中南财經政法大學新結構經濟學研究中心
主講｜Speaker
趙昕，對外經濟貿易大學國際經濟貿易學院，副教授。主要研究領域為微觀經濟理論、政治經濟學以及行為/實驗經濟學，研究成果已發表于RAND Journal of Economics，Games and Economic Behavior，Canadian Journal of Economics，Journal of Regulatory Economics等期刊，并主持一項國家自然科學基金面上項目。
摘要｜Abstract
This paper studies how the composition and voting rule of a decision-making committee affect the incentives for its members to acquire information. Fixing the voting rule, a more polarized committee acquires more information under mild conditions. If a committee designer can choose the committee members and voting rule to maximize her payoff from the collective decision, she forms a heterogeneous committee adopting a unanimous rule, in which one member moderately biased toward one decision serves as the decisive voter, and all others are extremely opposed to the decisive voter and serve as information providers. The preference of the decisive voter is not perfectly aligned with that of the designer.
