主題｜Topic：Markup Dispersion and Partial Industry Coverage of Environmental Regulation
時間｜Time：10月27日（周五）16:40-17:30
地點｜Venue：文澴樓539教室｜Class Room 539，WENHUAN
主講｜Speaker
李昊洋，南京農業大學經濟管理學院教授。博士畢業于密歇根州立大學經濟學專業，獲經濟學和環境科學與政策雙博士學位。主持或參與多項國家自然科學基金項目。研究成果發表于American Journal of Agricultural Economics、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management、Journal of the Association of Environment and Resource Economists等經濟學國際權威學術期刊。
摘要｜Abstract
The environmental economics literature has long established that, in order for environmental regulation to be cost-effective, all polluters need to be regulated so that their marginal abatement costs are equalized. The “full coverage” of polluters is more important for carbon regulation: since almost all sectors emit greenhouse gases, they should all face the same carbon price. In this paper, we make the case for “partial coverage” where only a subset of polluting industries is regulated in a general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms regulated by a cap-and-trade system with auctioned permits. Environmental regulation, by moving factors of production from dirtier to cleaner industries, ameliorates the damages of imperfect competition if the cleaner industries also have higher markups (and thus lower outputs). Partial coverage dominates full coverage if and only if the correlation between industry emission intensities and markups, weighted by emission targets, is more negative under partial than full coverage. Partial coverage always dominates full coverage when the abatement target is moderate, and the covered industries might not be those with the highest emission intensities. We apply the model to carbon regulation in China and identify which industries should be covered under different abatement targets.
