主題｜Topic：Self-Commitment for Cooperation
時間｜Time：06.19（周一）14: 00-15: 30
地點｜Venue：文澴樓教室｜Class Room 711，WENHUAN
主講｜Speaker
Jaimie Wei-Hung Lien，美國衛爾斯利女子學院學士，美國加利福尼亞大學聖地亞哥分校碩士、博士，山東大學經濟研究院教授、博士生導師，山大特聘教授。
研究領域包括：行為經濟學、實驗經濟學、應用微觀經濟學，研究主題涉及合作互惠、參照依賴、現時偏誤、代表性偏誤等重要行為現象。先後主持過國家自然科學基金項目、教育部科研項目、香港研究資助局項目。目前已有論文發表于Nature Communications、PNAS、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior等國際知名期刊。曾獲"中國信息經濟學2016青年創新獎"、"中國信息經濟學2018青年創新獎"和"中國信息經濟學2011-2015理論貢獻獎"。
摘要｜Abstract
We propose a new mechanism to promote socially efficient behavior in games where individual strategic incentives distinctly discourage it, as exemplified by the classic Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our belief-free mechanism, which allows individuals to make a self-commitment regarding their future behavior, is fully voluntary for participants and maximizes social welfare in equilibrium, contrary to previously studied mechanisms which involve external or peer enforcement through costly punishment or reward. A laboratory experiment demonstrates that the mechanism is highly effective, producing significantly higher average cooperation rates over a ten-round experiment than in the control group, and increasing cooperation rates over time in contrast to the decreasing cooperation rates in the control group. Analysis shows that the mechanism succeeds through high participation rates in self-commitment, and in turn, high cooperation rates in the Prisoner's Dilemma among those who voluntarily committed. The mechanism has the advantage of being easy to implement, and thus can serve as an effective practical approach to encouraging cooperative behavior without institutional enforcement.
